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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
and in default of issue, to his next of kin. At the time of the creation of the life
estate the plaintiff was a sister of the life tenant, but subsequently, and prior
to the death of the life tenant, plaintiff was adopted by a third person. It was
held that upon the death of the life tenant without issue, plaintiff could not
take as the next of kin of the life tenant, since the remainder so created was
contingent until the death of the life tenant, and at that time the plaintiff was
not entitled as his next of kin since section 16 (b) of the Intestate Act provides
that an adopted child cannot inherit from the family of his natural parents.
In Hall's Estate1 the plaintiff was adopted by proceedings in the Or-
phans' Court in New Jersey, under a decree which expressly reserved his
right of inheritance from his natural parents. It was held that he was entitl-
ed to inherit from his natural parents in Pennsylvania, even though a decree
of adoption in this state would have precluded him from so doing. The Court
said that adoption proceedings are contractual in their nature, and rights re-
served therein to the adopted child may be asserted by him in the courts of
any other jurisdiction.
The final point to be noted from the decisions appears in Herner's Estate8
where the Court said that property passing upon death to an adopted son of
decedent's daughter is subject to transfer inheritance tax under section 2 ol
the Act of May 15, 1925 P. L. 806, at the rate of 10%7, The term "adopted
children" as used in that statute, refers only to those adopted by the decedent
himself. The Court reaches this result because the act uses the words "child"
and "lineal descendants." The former is limited to issue of the first genera-
tion and "lineal descendants" means issue more remote. On the same basis
the Court says that an "adopted child" is a child of the first generation, and
not more remote. Therefore an adopted person more remote than the first
generation is not included within the definition of a direct descendant under
the act, so he must pay tax as a collateral at the rate of 10%.
Jesse P. Long.
CIVIL LIABILITY CREATED BY THE VIOLATION OF A PENAL
STATUTE IN PENNSYLVANIA
If conduct which is not criminal but which is harmful to an individual is
made criminal by statute, is such conduct, by implication, made a civil wrong
1720 Pa. D. & C. 214 (1934).
l819 Pa. D. & C. 563 (1933).
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at the suit of the individual injured thereby? This question has received
varying answers from the courts.
The answer to this question depends upon the character of the legal duty
that the statute creates. A legal duty means liability to legal sanction, i.e.,
some evil to be suffered in consequence of violating a rule of law. A person
who will incur a legal sanction if he acts or does not act, is, respectively, under
a legal duty not to act or to act. A duty is owed to the person who, accord-
ing to law, may enforce the legal remedy for its breach. Duties are of two
classes, absolute and relative. Absolute duties are owed only to the state
which imposes them. Relative duties are owed to persons other than the state
which imposes them and correlative with rights vested in the person to whom
they are owed.
The answer to the question under consideration therefore depends upon
whether the duty created by the statute whose violation has caused an injury
to an individual was absolute or relative.
Much of the difficulty caused by this problem in Pennsylvania has been
caused by the decision of the court in the comparatively early case of
Mack v. Wright., The court held that'if the legislature had intended to cre-
ate a civil liability in addition to the penalty imposed by the statute it would
have so stated, thus giving the statute strict construction. The court went on
to say that the presumption is that where a statute imposes a duty where none
before existed, the remedy provided therein for the breach of the duty is ex-
clusive. This case has been followed by the dicta in one later case. 2 In the
opinion the court stated that nothing was shown to charge the defendant
with negligence except the failure to comply with the duty required by the
statute and that such failure was not shown to be the proximate cause of the
injury. This later statement has provided a loophole wherein the other cases
have entered to so undermine the doctrine that it can hardly be said to be the
law today. There is no case that expressly overrules the case of Mack v.
Wright, but the court has said that it was not without exceptions.3
1Mack v. Wright, 180 Pa. 472-"If the legislature had intended that in addition to the
penalty imposed by the statute under consideration for nonperformance of the duty prescribed
by it a party injured by such nonperformance should have an action for damages sustained
thereby it would have said so."
2Brynelson v. Turner, 239 Pa. 346-dicta; a specific penalty is attached to the act and it
is to be strictly construed.
3Danner v. Wells, 248 Pa. 105-"If a plain duty is imposed for the benefit of individuals,
and the penalty is obviously inadequate to compel performance the implication will be strong,
if not conclusive, that the penalty was meant to be cumulative to such remedy as the common
law gives when a duty owing to an individual is neglected."
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If we take the true basis of the decision in Mack v. Wright, namely, that
the violation of the statute was not the proximate cause of the injury but
merely an accompanying condition, then the cases in Pennsylvania can be
reconciled. Most of the cases involve statutes providing for the safety of
workmen in factories and mines. In these cases the court has decided that a
duty is owed not only to the public, but a duty is also owed to the individual
employed; hence for the breach of this duty the penal liability is not exclusive
of a civil liability.
Where the failure to perform the duty imposed by a penal statute creates
a civil liability it does so through the field of negligence. It is upon this ques-
tion that there is a great conflict of authority in the several states. To what
extent should the violation of a penal statute be regarded as negligence?
Should it be negligence per se or merely some evidence of negligence or should
the violation of the statute render the defendant absolutely liable for the re-
sults flowing from his act?
The cases in Pennsylvania depend upon the type of statute violated, thus
accounting for the difference in the decisions. In all the cases involving the
violation of a penal statute the plaintiff must be a member of the class of per-
sons whom the statute aims to protect,4 for it is axiomatic that to recover for
negligence the plaintiff must show a duty owing to the plaintiff.
The case of Stehle u. Jaeger Automatic Machine Co.,' has decided that
the statute providing for the safety of workmen may be penal and violations
upon conviction are punishable by fine and imprisonment, yet these remedies
are not exclusive and do not preclude the right of action for damages in a
civil proceeding. Although the court did not mention Mack v. Wright its
conclusion practically overrules that case. The court concludes by saying,
"if the injury resulted by reason of employment prohibited by law there can
and should be a recovery."
In this case and others where the violations of statutes prohibiting the
employment of minors in dangerous occupations are involved the courts are
more ready to find the defendant liable than in any others. One case held
that the defendant could not defend himself on the grounds of voluntary as-
4Drake v. Fenton. 237 Pa. 8--recovery was refused to a fireman who fell through an open
gate of an elevator shaft (which was in violation of a statute) because the owner owed no
duty to the plaintiff because he was on the premises under a license given by law.
5Stehle v. Jaeger Automatic Machine Co., 220 Pa. 617.
6Mack v. Wright, 180 Pa. 472.
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sumption of risk." Another case said. "when employment is shown to be il-
legal because forbidden by statute (child labor) that in itself is sufficient evi-
dence of the defendant's negligence and if the injury was sustained in the
course of that employment that would show sufficient causal relation to find
the defendant liable."'
Statutes involving the sale of firearms to minors are of the same type and
the court has held that in such cases the violation of the statute is negligence
per se and further the violation is treated as the proximate cause of the injury.'
In both these cases and the ones involving statutes prohibiting the employ-
ment of minors at dangerous occupations neither voluntary assumption of risk'0
nor contributory negligence is available as a defense.
Another class of cases involves statutes regarding general safety regula-
tions in mining, manufacturing, and buildings. These statutes are mandatory
and create a duty per se, but no cause of action arises from the breach of such
duty unless such wrongdoing is the proximate cause of the injury.1 ' In this
type of case the defense of contributory negligence is available to the defend-
ant. The defense of voluntary assumption of risk is not available to the de-
fendant, however.
12
Where the statute has been complied with, such as having a gate to close
an elevator shaft, but an injury has been suffered because the gate was left
7Lanahan v. Pittston Coal Mining Co., 218 Pa. 311-"An employer who has violated a
statute prohibiting the employment in certain factories or at dangerous work of children under
ages does so at his peril and if sued for personal injuries cannot defend on the ground of as-
sumption of risk."
sKrutilies v. Bull's Head Coal Co.. 249 Pa. 162-"When the employment of a minor is
shown to be illegal because forbidden by statute that in itself is sufficient evidence of the de-
fendant's negligence, and if the injury complained of occurred in the course of plaintiff's ser-
vice under such unlawful employment, that is enough to show a causal relation, and the law
will refer the injury to the original wrong as the proximate cause."
9Wassel v. Ludwig, 92 Pa. Super. Ct. 341-"When he sold the gun in defiance of the
statute he made himself liable for any injurious result which might naturally or probably flow
as a consequence of his act."
'0 Wassel v. Ludwig, 92 Pa. Super. Ct. 341.
"Johnson v. Endura Mfg. Co., 282 Pa. 322--The violation of a penal statute may con-
stitute negligence per se, but no right of action arises therefrom, unless such wrongdoing is the
proximate cause of the injury." Here the plaintiff was hired legally and was injured while
doing a legal task although at times he had performed tasks which he could not legally per-
form. Accord; McMillen v. Steele, 275 Pa. 584.
12Lanahan v. Araspha Mfg. Co., 240 Pa. 29 2--"The performance of the statutory duty
imposed upon the proprietor of an industrial plant is the only excuse which the law will accept
from him when charged with the disregard of it resulting in injuries to an employee unless the
latter be guilty of contributory negligence." Accord; Bollinger v. Crystal Sand Co., 232 Pa.
636; Fritz v. Elk Tanning Co., 258 Pa. 187; Jaras v. Wright, 263 Pa. 490.
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open by another employee the defendant is not liable. 13 The reason here is
obvious : first, the defendant did not violate the statute, and second, because
there is no duty upon the manager to follow his employees to see if they per-
form their tasks properly.
In summary we submit the following rule, if the statute was violated and
the person injured was one whom the statute aimed to protect, then :
1. If it was a statute prohibiting the sale of firearms to minors or the
employment of minors at certain dangerous occupations, then the violation is
negligence per se and is treated as the proximate cause of the injury. Further,
the defendant may not use the defence of voluntary assumption of risk or the
contributory negligence of the minor.14
2. If the statute is one involving the violation of statutes providing for
the general safety in mining, manufacturing, and buildings then the violation
is negligence per se, but proximate cause must be established in order to make
the violation actionable. The contributory negligence of the plaintiff will be
available as a defense, but voluntary assumption of risk will not be.
Dale F. Shughart.
PARTNERSHIP LIABILITY OF MEMBERS OF DEFECTIVE
CORPORATIONS
As the body of law governing corporations is being refined and perfected,
the question of defective incorporation and the results which arise therefrom
is steadily growing less important. However, there still remain situations in
which it may become necessary to determine just what is the status of the
members of a supposed corporation which actually has no legal existence as
such.
In this discussion the term "defective corporation" is used to describe an
association of individuals which purports to be a corporation, but which has
not attained either a de jure or a de facto corporate existence. Consequently.
since by hypothesis no corporate existence of any sort has been attained in
these cases, it is not necessary to consider at all the provisions of the various
laBeach v. Hyman, 254 Pa. 135.
1436 Dickinson Law Review 192.
1536 Dickinson Law Review 192.
